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THE DUAL INCOME TAX
SYSTEM – AN OVERVIEW
ROBIN BOADWAY*
O
ECD countries rely to varying degrees on
personal income taxes to raise revenues in a
fair and efficient way.Yet, despite the many differ-
ences in policy and institutional settings, their
income tax systems share some common features.
Tax policy specialists agree on the problems that
these features give rise to, but there is no consen-
sus on the appropriate reforms that should be
undertaken. Moreover, the record of major
reforms is decidedly mixed. Commissions in many
countries have presented proposals for far-reach-
ing reform of the personal tax system – an example
being the adoption of a personal consumption tax
system – but these have been rarely adopted in
practice. A notable exception is the dual
(“Nordic”) income tax system, which as an explic-
itly schedular system represents a significant
departure from the commonly used principle of
comprehensive income taxation.1 To put the tax
system in perspective, it is useful first to review the
basic features of income tax systems that are based
on the comprehensive principle and to outline the
difficulties.This will serve as a basis for presenting
the main features of the Nordic system, which is
largely motivated by addressing the problems of
comprehensive income taxation and its oft-pro-
posed counterpart,personal consumption taxation.
Comprehensive income as the basis for taxation
Most countries’ tax systems pay at least lip service
to the principle of comprehensive income taxation.
They define a single measure of taxable income
from all sources,and then apply a single rate sched-
ule. However, some fundamental administrative
and economic problems preclude the full applica-
tion of the comprehensive income principle.
Consider each in turn
Administrative problems
A pure comprehensive income tax system is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to implement. Some ele-
ments of comprehensive income are hard for
households to measure let alone for tax authorities
to verify. Examples include the following: imputed
income from assets of various sorts, such as hous-
ing and other consumer durables, and insurance
policies; accrued capital gains on financial and per-
sonal assets; the return on human capital accumu-
lated (as opposed to endowed); the return on per-
sonal business investments; real versus nominal
returns on financial assets; the value of the non-
market use of time for leisure or household pro-
duction; and gifts and inheritances received, possi-
bly net of those given.
The fact that actual income tax systems inevitably
end up excluding some sorts of income and taxing
others preferentially (e.g., capital gains) leaves
arbitrage – or evasion – opportunities to house-
holds, and these undermine the integrity of the tax
system. Moreover, under a progressive income tax
system, horizontal equity problems can arise if it is
difficult to implement an effective income averag-
ing system: income fluctuations per se increase
one’s tax liability.The consequence of these admin-
istrative problems is that income tax systems can-
not replicate the comprehensive income tax ideal.
Economic Problems
A comprehensive income tax system treats all
sources of income the same. Yet, standard public
finance principles suggest that there should gener-
ally be differential treatment of different sources
(and uses) of income. The broadest distinction of
sources of income is between labor income and
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between present consumption and future con-
sumption. A tax on labor and capital income com-
bined is roughly equivalent to a system that taxes
future consumption more heavily than present
consumption. The reason is that saving out of cur-
rent income is double-taxed: once when the
income is earned and again when the return on
that saving is earned. On efficiency grounds, it is
hard to justify such a system. On the contrary, a
reasonable case can be made for taxing present
and future consumption at the same rate, which in
simple terms can be achieved by zero taxation of
capital income to eliminate the double taxation.
Such a result requires particular assumptions
about the form of intertemporal preferences, espe-
cially involving the separability of consumption
decisions from labor-leisure choices over time.
Even if these assumptions are not satisfied,there is
no general presumption about which way they will
be violated, that is, whether the efficient tax on
capital income should be positive or negative. The
principle of insufficient reason suggests zero capi-
tal income taxation on these grounds. In any case,
there would be little justification for taxing capital
income at the same rate as labor income.
Similar considerations apply on equity grounds. If
the government were perfectly informed, it would
want to base its redistributive taxation on exoge-
nously given wealth of households – their endowed
human wealth (native ability) and endowed asset
wealth.The inability to observe these endowments
implies that some imperfect indicator of wealth
must be used as a tax base. Labor income would be
a good index of native ability if labor supply were
fixed and there was no human capital investment,
and capital income would be a good index of inher-
ited wealth if households kept the stock of their
inherited wealth intact. But even in this ideal case,
one may not want to tax labor and capital income
at the same rate: a common progressive tax on all
inherited wealth would generally entail a different
rate of tax on labor and capital income. In fact,
labor income reflects variable effort as well as the
return on investment in human capital, and capital
income includes the return on life-cycle savings, so
the optimal relation between labor and capital
income taxation becomes a complicated second-
best problem.If inherited asset wealth is dealt with
by an inheritance tax, there is presumption for
preferential taxation of capital income: the same
separability conditions that entail zero capital tax-
ation on efficiency grounds will also lead to zero
capital income taxation on equity grounds. To the
extent that inheritances could not be taxed, the
case for taxing capital income would be enhanced.
Other arguments can be mobilized for providing
preferential treatment of capital income. To the
extent that saving is for retirement (life-cycle
smoothing), a case can be made for sheltering cap-
ital income from taxation. For one thing, house-
holds may undersave for their retirement either
because of myopia or because they anticipate
transfers inversely related to their wealth in retire-
ment. As well, lifetime averaging arguments might
suggest some sheltering of saving for retirement,in
the absence of general averaging provision in the
tax system. Also, capital income might be much
more mobile internationally than labor income, in
which case national governments may prefer to
treat it preferentially. And, along the same lines, it
may be easier to evade.
Personal consumption taxation
One option for avoiding many of these problems is
to adopt a personal consumption tax system by
eliminating the taxation of capital income altogeth-
er.The latter can be achieved by treating assets on
either a designated or a tax-prepaid basis, allowing
households the discretion to choose subject to the
fact that for some assets one type of treatment may
be more suitable than another. Designated treat-
ment involves deducting savings from income, and
including the principal and accumulated returns in
the tax base when they are consumed. This is suit-
able for household business assets and human cap-
ital accumulation. Tax-prepaid treatment simply
involves excluding capital income from the tax
base, and is suitable for assets whose returns are
difficult to measure (e.g. housing).
Consumption taxation avoids most of the adminis-
trative problems of comprehensive income taxa-
tion,a major exception being taxing the use of non-
market time. It essentially leaves capital income
out of the tax base thereby avoiding the preferen-
tial treatment of present versus future consump-
tion. However, it has its own problems. Even
though it may not be desirable to tax capital
income at the same rate as labor income, by the
same token, it may not be desirable to exclude it
altogether. Thus, given the inability to tax leisure
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or household production, it would be desirable on
both efficiency and equity grounds to impose a tax
on capital income to the extent that future consump-
tion and non-market labor are complementary,
which might be a reasonable presumption.As well,a
personal consumption tax is to a large extent equiv-
alent to a tax on labor income, and as such inherited
wealth is not taxed. A case can be made for taxing
capital income as a presumptive way of taxing inher-
itances and gifts. Of course, to the extent that a per-
sonal consumption tax can be supplemented by a tax
on inheritances, this problem is avoided, although
there is then the further issue of whether the tax
should be on gross or net inheritances.
Finally, there may be political economy arguments
leading to capital income taxation. Even fully
rational and benevolent governments might tax
capital income for time consistency reasons.At any
time there is a stock of wealth that has already
been accumulated, and it will be perfectly rational
for governments that cannot commit to future tax
rates in advance to impose relatively high tax rates
on capital income.As well, public choice principles
suggest that the political system leads to the taxa-
tion of capital income as a way of redistributing to
voters in the majority. Since these arguments for
taxing capital income typically conflict with opti-
mal taxation principles, it might be argued that
putting in place a tax structure that constrains the
ability of the government to tax capital income –
such as a consumption tax system – might lead to
less capital income taxation.
Compromise tax systems
The combination of the problems with a compre-
hensive income tax, which taxes all sources of
income on a par, and a consumption tax system,
which avoids taxing capital income altogether,
leads one to a compromise system in which capital
income is taxed less than labor income, but is
nonetheless taxed.As we have seen, economic the-
ory offers little concrete advice about the appro-
priate extent of differential taxation. Here we sim-
ply take as given the case for some preferential
treatment of capital income, and consider the
issues that arise in designing such a system.
First, it should be noted that even in countries
where the comprehensive income tax principle is
respected, capital and labor income are already
treated differently. The overall tax structure
includes a mix of taxes of which personal taxation
is only one component. Other major components
include general sales and payroll taxes, which are
effectively equivalent to proportional consumption
taxes (the sales tax treating assets as designated
and the payroll tax treating them on a tax-prepaid
basis). Thus, the combination of income, sales and
payroll taxes provides preferential treatment to
capital income.There are some other forms of tax-
ation that partly undo this favorable treatment of
capital income, such as property taxes, which espe-
cially affect housing, and various forms of taxes on
business income, which affect owners of shares in
businesses to the extent that integration with the
personal tax does not offset it. However, the typi-
cal tax mix does not treat asset income in a sys-
tematic way.As noted above, income taxes tend to
provide favorable tax treatment to certain types of
assets to the exclusion of others, leading to ineffi-
ciencies and inequities as well as to compliance
and enforcement problems.
These features of existing tax systems highlight
some issues that arise in designing a tax system
intended to provide preferential treatment to capi-
tal income. One is the question of the comprehen-
siveness of the capital income component of the tax
base. On broad economic efficiency and equity
grounds, one might think that income from assets of
all sorts should be included on an equivalent basis.
However, two considerations militate against that.
First, it may still be desirable to encourage saving
for retirement for reasons mentioned earlier.There
may also be social reasons for providing preferential
tax treatment to owner-occupied housing and per-
haps to personal businesses.Second,the administra-
tive difficulties of taxing (real) asset incomes
remain: some forms of asset income are difficult to
measure on an imputed or accrued basis and to
index to inflation. Potentially these problems could
be addressed as they are in existing hybrid income
tax systems, that is, by providing preferential treat-
ment to certain types of assets. Of course, once this
is done, households will have an incentive to hold
assets in a tax-sheltered form, whether that is the
intention of the preferential treatment or not.
Another question concerns the rate structure.
Given that different tax rates are to apply to capi-
tal and labor income, how should tax progressivity
differ between the two tax bases? The choice of a
rate structure involves both value judgments aboutvertical equity and economic judgments about the
efficiency or incentive consequences of marginal
tax rates. On purely equity grounds, one might
expect progressivity to be higher the more the tax
base reflects household endowments rather than
rewards for discretionary actions. Progressivity of
the labor income tax would be higher the less
responsive are labor earnings to after-tax wages,
and the greater is the differential in native abilities
among the population. Responsiveness here would
take into account not only variable labor supply,
but also effects on occupational choice, labor mar-
ket participation, migration and tax evasion.There
might also be effects on human capital investment,
but these are offset by the facts that human capital
investment that takes the form of forgone earnings
is effectively tax deductible, and resource costs of
education are largely paid by the state. Similarly,
the capital income tax would be more progressive
the less responsive is asset accumulation to the
after-tax return to saving, the more difficult it is to
avoid or evade taxes,and the more unequal is asset
ownership in the population.The case for progres-
sive capital income taxation is significantly mitigat-
ed by the existence of wealth or wealth transfer
taxes, such as taxes on bequests or inheritances,
given that progressivity is ultimately intended to
address inequalities in endowed wealth.
One further complicating factor concerns the vari-
ability of different sources of income.In the case of
labor income, this variability might be predictable,
as in the case of seasonal work, or it might reflect
riskiness associated with uncertainty of employ-
ment or earnings. A progressive tax system dis-
criminates against variable income and causes
problems of horizontal inequity as well as adverse
incentive effects. These may be mitigated by the
social insurance system or potentially by income
averaging for tax purposes, but it is typically diffi-
cult for workers to self-insure against uncertain
incomes.In the case of capital income,variability is
more likely to arise from uncertainty alone.To the
extent that capital markets are efficient, much of
the uncertainty of asset returns can be undone by
pooling risks, but some residual uncertainty will
remain, and it will differ from asset to asset.Again,
a progressive tax system will discourage the
demand for risky assets and will lead to horizontal
inequity, but one might expect that the problem is
less severe for capital income than for labor
income, whose variability is especially harmful to
the most vulnerable workers.
Taking all of these considerations into account, one
might reasonably argue that the tax on labor income
should be more progressive than the tax on capital
income,especially in the presence of taxes on wealth
transfers between generations and a strong social
safety net for the most unfortunate workers.
Another issue that arises in a tax system that treats
labor and capital income differentially is the incen-
tive to report labor income as capital income. This
is particularly a problem for unincorporated busi-
nesses where the distinction between capital and
labor income is ambiguous: business owners put
their own equity capital into the firm as well as
providing managerial or entrepreneurial input.
Owners will have an incentive to report low
salaries and to overstate the profits of the firm
(which themselves are difficult to impute). The
problem of dealing with personal business income
is one that plagues virtually every tax system,
whether it is designed according to comprehensive
income principles, consumption tax principles, or
some combination of the two.
A related problem concerns the relation between
the personal and the corporation tax systems. One
of the main functions of the latter is to act as a
withholding device against personal income earned
within a corporation,which is otherwise difficult to
tax on an accrual basis at the personal level. To
achieve this, it is necessary to credit shareholders
with the corporate tax that has been withheld once
the funds are taken out of the corporation as divi-
dends or realized capital gains.This can be done by
the so-called imputation method, whereby credits
are made available on dividends or capital gains,by
an exemption method whereby dividends or real-
ized capital gains are simply subject to a lower tax
rate, or by crediting payouts at the corporate level.
In an open economy,the imputation method has an
advantage in terms of being better able to restrict
integration to domestic shareholders.Integration is
made more difficult both by progressivity in the
personal taxation of capital income and by the dif-
ferential tax treatment of different types of assets.
In either case, it is virtually impossible for the cor-
poration to withhold at the correct rate for all its
shareholders. The relation between the personal
and corporate tax also applies to interest income.
Interest income can readily be taxed at the person-
al level, so most corporate tax systems deduct
interest payments from the tax base. But, differ-
CESifo DICE Report 3/2004 6
ForumCESifo DICE Report 3/2004 7
Forum
ences in personal and corporate tax rates will influ-
ence shareholders’ preferences for debt versus
equity financing.Again, this problem is difficult to
overcome if interest income of different persons is
taxed at different rates because of progressivity or
preferential treatment.
Finally, tax compliance may be more difficult with
capital income than with labor income. It relies
more on self-reporting (as opposed to withholding
at source), and verification may be more difficult
for the authorities, especially if foreign assets are
held. This problem can be mitigated by requiring
financial institutions – including foreign ones, by
international agreement – to withhold taxes on
capital income paid to creditors. This too will be
administratively more difficult if different house-
holds pay different tax rates on capital income.
The dual “Nordic” income tax system
The Nordic tax system represents a particular
approach to achieving a compromise between the
taxation of capital income and labor income (or,
more generally, non-capital income to the extent
that it includes pensions and other forms of trans-
fers). It is a compromise that has some attractive
features from a tax administration point of view.
The Nordic system is a dual income tax system in
which capital income is taxed according to a sepa-
rate tax schedule than labor income.The basic fea-
tures of the ideal dual income tax system – not all
of which have been fully implemented in the
Nordic countries – are straightforward. Two tax
bases are reported,one for capital income,and one
for other sources of household income.The former
includes, in principle, capital income of all types
from all assets, including interest, dividends and
capital gains from financial assets, imputed rent on
housing, accrued returns on pension savings, and
profits from personal businesses. Thus, the capital
income base is broader than existing hybrid
income tax systems, which typically shelters some
forms of capital income. Capital income is then
taxed at a uniform proportional rate equivalent to
the lowest marginal tax rate on other income.
The non-capital income category includes earnings
as well as pensions and transfers from government.It
is taxed according to a progressive rate structure,
which incorporates any credits and deductions used
to achieve horizontal and vertical equity.The corpo-
ration income tax rate is then set at the personal cap-
ital income tax rate and is fully integrated with the
latter using the imputation or some other method.
Taken in the context of the broader tax system –
which includes a general tax on consumer purchas-
es and payroll taxes – the dual income tax system
results in capital income tax rates that are signifi-
cantly lower than tax rates on other income, and
much less progressive. And, although it is not part
of the dual income tax system, a useful comple-
ment is a tax on wealth transfers between genera-
tions, perhaps defined on a net basis.
The Nordic income tax system has a number of
advantages compared with hybrid income tax sys-
tems.The taxation of all sources of asset income at
a common rate avoids the inter-asset distortions
while still encouraging household saving.The pref-
erential tax treatment of capital income can be
defended both on efficiency and equity grounds,
especially in a context in which capital income is
mobile internationally. Compliance is simplified
for households, and the incentive to engage in
wasteful tax planning and arbitrage are reduced.
As well, the tax is simpler for revenue authorities
to administer.
The absence of a progressive rate structure might be
regarded as a disadvantage on equity grounds, but
that is offset by some other considerations.First,if a
wealth transfer tax accompanies the Nordic system,
vertical equity goals can be achieved. Second, to the
extent that capital income reflects life-cycle savings
behavior, a proportional tax works in favor of hori-
zontal equity since it does not discriminate against
those who choose to save more.Third,a proportion-
al rate structure avoids penalizing those who hold
risky assets. Finally, given that capital income is
highly mobile,the effects of a progressive rate struc-
ture can be to some extent undone by avoidance
and evasion by households with large amounts of
wealth. In any case, once a dual income system is in
place, it would be feasible to implement a progres-
sive rate structure for capital income.
Some outstanding issues
The Nordic income tax system remains an ideal,
like the comprehensive income and personal con-
sumption tax systems. An attempt to implement itwould encounter a number of issues, some of which
we highlight in this final section.The first of these is
the problem of measuring all elements of the capi-
tal income base. The same problems arise as in the
comprehensive income base. The imputed returns
from some assets are difficult to measure, including
housing equity and the returns from personal busi-
ness. Capital gains should in principle be included
on an accrual basis,as should the returns to pension
wealth.And, all capital income components – espe-
cially interest and capital gains – should be fully
indexed for inflation.
Next, some types of asset income are not included
even in the ideal dual tax system. One example of
this is consumer durables other than housing.
Another is the return to human capital accumula-
tion. In both cases, they would effectively be treated
on a consumption tax basis, so would not be taxed.
Measurement problems are less severe for labor
income, but not absent. Earnings from the labor
contribution to personal businesses are difficult to
measure since they are indistinct from profits:both
appear as the income of the business.In accounting
for this source of labor income, personal business
owners would have an incentive to count as much
income as possible as capital income unless they
are in the lowest income tax bracket.In addition to
this being inequitable, it can affect the decision to
incorporate. Labor income of the self-employed
might also be prone to understatement.
One major advantage of the dual income tax sys-
tem is the ease with which the corporate and per-
sonal taxes can be integrated.The use of a common
corporate and personal tax rate on capital income
facilitates this. Nonetheless, some problems can
arise. If the personal tax rate on capital income is
constrained to be the same as the lowest labor
income tax rate, this constrains the ability of the
corporate tax to respond to capital tax competi-
tion. If corporate tax rates are competed down
internationally, net capital inflows would fall if the
corporate tax rate could not be lowered. If the cor-
porate tax rate were allowed to fall below the min-
imum labor income tax rate, the advantages of the
dual income tax system would require that the per-
sonal tax on capital rate fall as well, and that might
be regarded as inequitable.
Proportionality of the capital income tax schedule
is also contentious. The Nordic income tax system
calls for a proportional tax on capital income,
whereas nothing in principle prevents a progres-
sive tax structure being employed, even if it
detracts from simplicity.The case for a progressive
rate structure can be countered by a couple of fac-
tors. To the extent that a tax on inheritances is in
place, the case for redistributing asset income is
weakened, as we have mentioned.As well, the gain
from a progressive capital tax structure on equity
grounds can be relatively little.The mobility of the
capital income tax base, the fact that much vari-
ability of capital income reflects life-cycle effects,
and the relatively small amounts of revenue gener-
ated from increasing capital income tax rates at the
upper end all suggest that the gain from progres-
sivity may not offset the loss in simplicity.This will
especially be the case if the labor income tax
schedule is effective at redistributing to those who
are most in need.For example,a set of fully refund-
able income-contingent tax credits can be highly
effective at targeting transfers to those at the bot-
tom of the income distribution even under an oth-
erwise modestly progressive rate structure.
Finally, the dual income tax structure can have
advantages in a federal context. There are sound
arguments for allowing lower-level governments
access to direct taxes on personal labor income
jointly with the central government, while retain-
ing capital income taxes at the center. The dual
income tax makes this possible. The same argu-
ment might be extended to an economic union
context where there is no autonomous central gov-
ernment. If all nations adopted a dual income tax,
it would be possible – and desirable – for capital
income taxes to be coordinated among nations,
while leaving labor income taxes uncoordinated.
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